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Abstract: Cross-culturally, participants in public goods games reward participants and 
punish defectors to a degree beyond that warranted by rational, profit-maximizing 
considerations. Costly punishment, where individuals impose costs on defectors at a cost to 
themselves, is thought to promote the maintenance of cooperation. However, despite 
substantial variation in the extent to which people punish, little is known about why some 
individuals, and not others, choose to pay these costs. Here, we test whether personality 
traits might contribute to variation in helping and punishment behavior. We first replicate a 
previous study using public goods scenarios to investigate effects of sex, relatedness and 
likelihood of future interaction on willingness to help a group member or to punish a 
transgressor. As in the previous study, we find that individuals are more willing to help 
related than unrelated needy others and that women are more likely to express desire to 
help than men. Desire to help was higher if the probability of future interaction is high, at 
least among women. In contrast, among these variables, only participant sex predicted 
some measures of punitive sentiment. Extending the replication, we found that punitive 
sentiment, but not willingness to help, was predicted by personality traits. Most notably, 
participants scoring lower on Agreeableness expressed more anger towards and greater 
desire to punish a transgressor, and were more willing to engage in costly punishment, at 
least in our scenario. Our results suggest that some personality traits may contribute to 
underpinning individual variation in social enforcement of cooperation. 
Keywords: reciprocity, altruistic punishment, prisoner’s dilemma, ultimatum game, 
evolutionary economics 
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Introduction 
The evolution of cooperation is a problem of great interest not only to a wide range 
of evolutionary and behavioral disciplines, but also to policy makers and society at large 
(Hardin, 1968). Established partial solutions to this problem include kin altruism 
(Hamilton, 1964), reciprocal altruism (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971), 
reputation building (Alexander, 1987) and costly signaling (Zahavi, 1995). However, there 
remain several puzzling aspects in human cooperative behavior that seem to defy 
explanation by any of these mechanisms (e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Fehr, Firschbacher 
and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002). These behaviors arise in the context of 
experimental games which are intentionally structured so as to ensure that participants’ 
behavior cannot be logically attributed to any of the standard explanations of cooperation. 
Players are total strangers to each other (excludes kin altruism), they make their decisions 
anonymously (excludes reputation building and costly signaling) and they only interact 
with each other once (excludes reciprocal altruism) although the latter condition may not 
perfectly capture real-world conditions, especially those in the ancestral past, where 
probability of future interaction would very rarely have been zero (see Burnham and 
Johnson, 2005; Hagen and Hammerstein, 2006; Trivers, 2004). Despite this, they still 
choose to reward participants and punish defectors in ways that are irrational from the 
viewpoint of calculating, self-interested agents who organize their behavior around income 
maximization (Fehr et al., 2002; Price, Cosmides, and Tooby, 2002). These puzzling results 
have been replicated with participants drawn from a wide range of cultures around the 
world (Henrich et al., 2006). 
For example, the public goods paradigm (Egas and Riedl, 2008; Fehr and Gächter, 
2000, 2002) typically involves participants who are given a number of monetary units 
(MU) at the start of the experiment, of which they can contribute any portion they want to a 
collective group project. Every MU invested by a player yields a payoff of less than 1 MU 
for every group member, while every MU withheld by a player yields a payoff of exactly 1 
MU for that particular player and 0 MU for the other players. This payoff structure ensures 
that while all players would come out with a positive return to their investment if they 
invested their entire endowment to the common project, any single player can do even 
better by withholding funds from the project while reaping the benefits of the other players’ 
contributions. All contributions are made simultaneously, they are anonymous, and the 
groups are broken up at the end of every round, such that no two participants ever play with 
each other more than once. At the end of every round participants are informed about the 
other members’ contributions to the project (though not their identities) and can choose, at 
their own personal expense, to punish other members for not contributing to the project. 
For example participants might be allowed to give up 1 MU in order to deprive another 
player of 3 MU (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Given the rules of the game a rational, self-
interested player should never punish, yet players do routinely punish fellow players who 
make below-average contributions. Since all interactions are one-off and the punisher can 
never directly benefit from any subsequent change in the punished player’s cooperative 
behavior, this type of behavior is often described as ‘altruistic punishment’ (Bowles and 
Gintis, 2002; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Fehr and Gächter, 2002). This sort of punishment has 
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beneficial effects in sustaining high investment levels, as punished members raise their 
contributions in subsequent rounds, even though they interact with new players in each 
round. This surprising outcome stands in stark contrast to the no-punishment condition of 
the game, where players are not allowed to punish free-riders. In this condition cooperation 
gradually dwindles, with most participants eventually contributing nothing to the project 
(Fehr and Firschbacher, 2004; Fehr and Gächter, 2002). 
Results like this have led to the emergence of ‘strong reciprocity’ as a general term 
to describe humans’ tendency to punish defectors and reward co-operators beyond what is 
warranted by rational choice theory (Fehr et al., 2002; Gintis, 2000; Gintis, Henrich, 
Bowles, Boyd, and Fehr, 2008) and where other standard evolutionary explanations do not 
apply. There is yet no consensus as to the evolutionary significance of this phenomenon 
(Gintis et al., 2008; Kiyonari and Barclay, 2008; Price, 2008; Price et al., 2002; Sigmund, 
2007), but one suggestion is that it may have evolved by enforcing cooperation between 
group members, with selection acting at the level of human groups (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, 
and Richerson, 2003; Fehr et al., 2002; Gintis et al., 2008). 
Previous studies indicate remarkable variation in individual engagement in both 
costly punishment and helping (Barclay, 2006; O'Gorman, Wilson, and Miller, 2005), and 
there is growing interest in the sources of this individual variation (Bergmüller, Schürch, 
and Hamilton, 2010). Indeed, this is true of behavior in experimental games in general. For 
example, there is widespread heterogeneity in rejection of offers in the ultimatum game 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and this appears to be under significant genetic influence 
(Wallace, Cesarini, Lichtenstein, and Johannesson, 2007). Wallace et al. (2007) argue that 
this variation may contribute to the mixed success that has met attempts to find satisfactory 
correlates of behavior in experimental games, and that further efforts should explore links 
between behavior in economic games and the significant source of variation in behavior 
that derives from personality traits. Likewise, Bergmüller et al. (2010) highlight the 
potential role of personality (or ‘behavioral syndromes’) in determining individual 
differences in cooperative behavior in animals. 
The aim of this study was to explicitly investigate these possible links between 
personality traits and variation in helping and punishment behaviors. We framed our study 
within evolutionarily informed theories of personality that suggest that variance in human 
personality traits can be attributed to selective advantages of different responses to 
recurrent social problems faced by our ancestors (Buss, 1984, 1991; Michalski and 
Shackelford, 2010). Consequently, each trait can be considered to be a result of various 
trade-offs; for instance, individuals scoring high in extraversion report more sexual partners 
but also more injuries (Nettle, 2005). In this light, it is reasonable to question how 
personality traits help to shape individual behavior in the face of social dilemmas 
(Michalski and Shackelford, 2010). Here, motivated by growing recognition of the 
possibility that personality traits underpin at least some variation in cooperation in humans 
and animals (Wallace et al., 2007; Bergmüller et al., 2010), we investigate the role of 
personality in shaping behavior in social scenarios calling for cooperative responses or 
responses to a social transgression in a cooperative setting. 
To do this, we set out to replicate and extend the design of O’Gorman et al. (2005) 
that tested individuals’ desire to help or punish in various hypothetical scenarios. These 
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scenarios elicited marked individual variation in willingness to help and punish. In their 
study, desire to help an unfortunate other was influenced by both relatedness and 
probability of future interaction, as predicted by evolutionary considerations. Individuals 
were more willing to help relatives than strangers, and more willing to help if there was 
high probability of future interactions. In contrast, desire to punish free-riders was 
moderated by neither of these variables, leading O’Gorman et al. to conclude that altruistic 
helping and punishing behavior were underpinned by different proximate psychological 
factors. Willingness to engage in punishment might therefore be influenced either by 
contextual variables not captured in O’Gorman et al.’s study, or by other causes of 
individual variation such as personality traits. Here, we specifically focused on this second 
potential source of variation – personality traits. Following general predictions about 
possible costs and benefits of each of the Big Five Model domains proposed by Nettle 
(2006), we considered how these domains might relate to tendency to engage in 
punishment. In particular, we predicted that willingness to punish might be specifically 
driven by variation along the Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and 
Neuroticism domains. It is well established that variation in these domains affects social 
interactions across various contexts. For example, Extraversion is intrinsically linked to 
engagement in social interactions. With regard to Agreeableness, the lower end of the 
dimension is characterized by descriptors such as hostility and spitefulness. Those scoring 
low on this dimension are less likely to compromise during inter-personal conflicts, while 
those scoring high receive higher levels of peer acceptance, have more mutual friends and 
better outcomes in cooperative tasks (Jensen-Campbell, Adams, Perry, Workman, Furdella, 
and Egan, 2002; Jensen-Campbell and Graziano, 2001; Koole, van den Berg, Vlek, and 
Hofstee, 2001). Nettle (2006) highlights that larger and looser social groupings will select 
for lower Agreeableness than smaller, closer ones. People scoring high on 
Conscientiousness tend to favor social norms (McCrae and John, 1992), exhibit strong 
moral principle (Nettle, 2006) and have higher peer acceptance (Jensen-Campbell and 
Malcolm, 2007). Finally, individuals who score highly on Neuroticism may experience 
anger more readily, which may lead to increased engagement in costly punishment (Seip, 
van Dijk, and Rotteveel, 2009). 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
We recruited 211 participants (104 male, 97 female, 10 not reported) who were 
visitors to a local science museum. Participants were aged between 16 and 78 years (M ± 
SD; 33.3 ± 12.6). This is a wider range than that in O’Gorman et al.’s (2005) study, 
allowing us to generalize beyond a narrow undergraduate sample. 
 
Procedure 
Each participant answered questions relating to two separate fictional scenarios (a 
helping and a punishment scenario) adapted from O’Gorman et al. (2005) (for a full 
description, see Appendix). The scenarios were presented in randomized order. Briefly, in 
the helping scenario, participants were asked to imagine that, together with nine others 
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(either cousins or strangers), they had pooled their money to invest in the stock market, but 
the investment only broke even and one member had anticipated a profit to pay for 
emergency medical bills. This unfortunate person was either moving to another town or 
living in the same town, depending on the condition. This scenario therefore shared the 
punishment scenario’s 2 (Relatedness) x 2 (Probability of future interaction) factorial 
design, with four dependent variables: sympathy for the person, desire to help the person, 
level of anger towards other group members that were unwilling to help the person (each 
on a 1 to 9 scale), and the maximum amount the participant would be willing to give to 
help the person. 
The punishment scenario also involved the participant pooling investment funds 
with nine other people (cousins or strangers), but in this scenario one participant had 
cheated by contributing considerably less than the agreed-upon amount. While everyone 
had contributed £1000, the transgressor had contributed only £200, and, since the profits 
had been split equally, the transgressor ended up receiving £2160 more than he deserved. 
The transgressor was either moving to another town, or living in the same town, depending 
on the condition. This again yielded a 2 x 2 factorial design with four conditions in total. 
The dependent variables were responses to four items. Two of them recorded participants’ 
anger towards, and desire to punish, the transgressor (on a nine point scale). There were 
also two items that asked participants to indicate the amount of money they thought the 
transgressor should pay and the amount they would personally be willing to spend in order 
to punish him/her. 
Participants also provided their age and sex, and completed a brief measure of the 
Big Five personality factors, the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI), which includes two 
items per factor and is thus quick to administer (which suited the setting of this study) but 
nonetheless correlates well with both the longer Big-Five Inventory and the NEO 
Personality Inventory (Gosling, Rentflow, and Swann, 2003). In our data, internal 
consistency between items was as follows: extraversion (Cronbach’s α = .67), 
agreeableness (α = .11), conscientiousness (α = .37), neuroticism (emotional stability in 
Gosling et al.; α = .45), openness (α = .26). 
In analysis of the data, we again followed the approach of O’Gorman et al. (2005), 
using factorial ANOVA with relatedness and probability of future interaction as between-
subject factors. We included participants’ scores on the personality dimensions as 
covariates. Although the dependent variables were not always normally distributed, 
ANOVA is robust to this violation (Field, 2005). Data were analyzed in SPSS, version 18. 
Where appropriate, we include estimates of effect size, usually Cohen’s d, for which d of 
.20, .50 and .80 are indicative of a small, medium and large effect, respectively (Cohen, 
1992). 
Results 
Validity checking 
We first carried out a validity check of our scenario-setting, by analyzing the data as 
a simple replication of O’Gorman et al.’s study, without accounting for personality traits. 
Analysis of the helping scenario revealed a number of significant effects (in all cases, the 
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overall ANOVA models were significant at α = .05). There were main effects of 
relatedness (see Figure 1a) with regard to sympathy for the person [F(1,192) = 5.36, p = 
.022, d = .33], desire to help [F(1,190) = 12.77, p < .001, d = .52] and amount of money 
participants would be willing to give [F(1,174) = 14.39, p < .001, d = .57], but not for anger 
at non-helpers [F(1,185) = 3.21, p = .08, d = .26]. There were also main effects of 
participant sex (see Figure 1b), with women expressing greater sympathy for the person 
[F(1,192) = 9.97, p = .002, d = .45] and desire to help [F(1,190) = 11.37, p = .001, d = .49], 
but there was no effect of sex on anger at non-helpers [F(1,185) = .52, p = .47, d = .11] or 
on the amount participants would be willing to give [F(1,174) = 2.10, p = .15, d = .22]. 
Contrary to O’Gorman et al. (2003), there was no main effect of probability of future 
interactions on helping, but there were several significant interaction effects with 
participant sex: analysis showed that while men’s responses were relatively insensitive to 
the likelihood of future interaction, women tended to express more sympathy when future 
interactions were likely [F(1,192) = 3.48, p = .064, d = .27], were more willing to help 
[F(1,190) = 4.14, p = .043, d = .29], were more angry at non-helpers [F(1,185) = 6.65, p = 
.011, d = .38] and were willing to give more money to the unfortunate group member 
[F(1,174) = 4.02, p = .046, d = .31]. 
In contrast, in the punishment scenario, there were no significant main effects of 
relatedness, future interaction or sex across any of the four dependent variables, nor any 
significant interaction effects. The only factor that approached significance was a main 
effect of sex [F(1,192) = 3.41, p = .066, d = .26], but only in participants’ desire to punish 
the cheater (M ± SE; males: 5.4 ± 2.5, females: 4.7 ± 2.6). We further investigated the 
amount that participants would be willing to pay to punish because this variable was highly 
skewed, with 60% of participants indicating they would pay nothing at all. On this basis, 
we further tested this variable using binary logistic regression, comparing those who would 
pay nothing and those who were willing to pay something. This analysis revealed a main 
sex effect (Wald’s χ2 = 5.48, df = 1, p = .019) with men being more willing to pay to punish 
than women, and an interaction between sex and likelihood of future interaction 
(Wald’s χ2 = 3.99, df = 1, p = .046), such that women were especially reticent to pay when 
meeting again was more likely. 
 
Effect of personality 
To investigate the contributions of personality traits on responses to the scenarios, 
we re-ran the analyses as before, including participant sex, relatedness and likelihood of 
future interaction as factors, now also including as covariates the participants’ scores on the 
Big Five personality dimensions. 
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Figure 1. Effects of (a) relatedness and (b) participant sex in the helping scenario. Data 
show mean (± SE) sympathy to an unfortunate group member, desire to help, anger at non-
helpers, and the amount participants would be willing to give to help.  
 
Note: In a), individuals are more sympathetic and willing to help cousins 
(open bars) than strangers (shaded bars), more angry at non-helpers if the 
unfortunate person is a cousin, and willing to pay more to help cousins 
than strangers. In b), male participants (open bars) are significantly less 
sympathetic and willing to help than female participants (shaded bars).  
*p < .1, ** p <.05, ***p < .01 
 
In the helping scenario, the only dependent variable that was significantly predicted 
from any of the Big Five dimensions was sympathy for the unfortunate person. High scores 
on Agreeableness predicted increased sympathy towards the unfortunate group member (β 
= .31 ± .16, p = .047), with no other significant effects of personality dimension. 
In the punishment scenario, in contrast, analyses revealed several significant 
relationships between participants’ responses and scores on personality dimensions (see 
Table 1). In particular, participants who scored lower on the Agreeableness dimension 
expressed more anger towards (p = .008) and greater desire to punish (p < .0001) the 
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transgressor, and thought the transgressor should pay more in reparation (p = .037). In 
addition, participants who scored higher on Conscientiousness expressed greater anger 
towards the transgressor (p = .033) and those scoring lower on Extraversion expressed 
greater desire to punish (p = .016). Finally, as before, we further tested effects of 
personality traits on those who were willing to pay at least something to punish the 
transgressor (a binarized version of the final dependent variable), using logistic regression. 
In this analysis, lower scores on the Agreeableness dimension also predicted willingness to 
pay to punish the transgressor (p = .045). 
 
Table 1. Relationships between personality attributes and behavior directed towards a 
transgressor 
 Anger Desire Amount he 
should pay 
back 
Amount 
willing to pay 
to punish 
Pay something 
to punish 
 B  
(SE) 
p B 
(SE) 
p B 
(SE) 
p B  
(SE) 
p B 
(SE) 
p 
E -.083 
(.096) 
 
.324 -.324 
(.133) 
.016 -41.5 
(58.0) 
.475 -22.2 
(30.5) 
.468 -.037 
(.119) 
.753 
A -.324 
(.122) 
 
.008 -.731 
(.169) 
< .001 -157.4 
(74.8) 
.037 -9.06 
(39.7) 
.820 -.307 
(.153) 
.045 
C .227 
(.106) 
 
.033 .111 
(.146) 
.448 .94 
(62.7) 
.988 -.70 
(33.8) 
.984 -.156 
(.130) 
.233 
N -.047 
(.103) 
 
.645 -.099 
(.142) 
.486 3.96 
(62.1) 
.949 -27.1 
(32.4) 
.404 -.041 
(.124) 
.740 
O -.017 
(.146) 
.909 .153 
(.202) 
.448 51.9 
(87.6) 
.555 45.2 
(49.9) 
.984 -.080 
(.178) 
.654 
Note: E = Extraversion; A = Agreeableness; C = Conscientiousness; N = Neuroticism; O = Openness; 
Significant effects are shown in bold 
Discussion 
Our results are broadly consistent with those of O’Gorman et al. (2005), who also 
found that participants were sensitive to context cues in the helping scenario but that these 
variables did not tend to predict behavior in the punishment scenario. Like O’Gorman et 
al., we found that relatedness cues predicted willingness to help, but not to punish. Effects 
of participant sex in our study were also in the same direction as those in O’Gorman et al.’s 
study: they found a near-significant tendency for women to express more sympathy for the 
group member in the helping scenario (this was significant in our study, as was desire to 
help), but in neither study did participant sex have effects on anger towards the transgressor 
or contributions to help. In the punishment scenario, O’Gorman et al. found that men 
expressed greater desire than women to punish the transgressor, while we found a near-
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significant difference in the same direction. In neither study were there significant sex 
differences in levels of anger, the amount that participants thought the transgressor should 
pay, nor in the amount they were willing to pay to punish (except where we binarized the 
data, which O’Gorman et al. did not do). As with O’Gorman et al., then, where sex 
differences did exist, men appeared more likely to engage in punishment than women. This 
could be because men tend to (and presumably did, in our evolutionary past) engage with 
larger groups on average than women, (e.g., Baumeister 2010), where the need for social 
enforcement of cooperation are greater. 
The main difference between our results and those of O’Gorman et al. was that we 
did not find a main effect of probability of future interaction in the helping scenario, 
although we did find significant interactions with sex, such that this effect was more 
important in women than men. We do not know the reason for this difference, but it could 
be due to the combination of stronger effects in women and O’Gorman et al. having a 
higher proportion of women in their sample than we did. However, with this exception, our 
results replicated the main findings of the earlier study and confirm the validity of the 
scenario-setting in our study, thus enabling us to proceed to examine effects of personality 
traits.  
As predicted, we found that engagement in punishment was correlated with 
personality, in particular with individuals’ score on the Agreeableness dimension. 
Participants who scored low on Agreeableness expressed greater anger towards, and desire 
to punish, the transgressor. They also felt the transgressor should pay more in reparation, 
and they expressed greater willingness to pay at least something to punish the transgressor. 
Higher scores on Conscientiousness also predicted anger towards the transgressor, although 
it did not correlate with other measures. Furthermore, individuals scoring low on 
Extraversion also indicated a higher desire to punish the transgressor. Conscientiousness 
and Extraversion predicted single aspects of behavior only (respectively, anger towards and 
desire to punish the transgressor) and not measures of actual reparation or monetary will to 
punish. O’Gorman et al. also reported that while most of their participants expressed high 
levels of anger and willingness to punish a transgressor, only some were willing to actually 
engage in altruistic punishment. Thus, the effects of Conscientiousness and Extraversion 
extend to emotional reaction towards, but not action against, the transgressor, in contrast to 
individuals scoring low on Agreeableness. 
The finding that people scoring lower on Agreeableness express greater anger 
towards defectors in a collaborative enterprise, and are more willing to punish them, is in 
line with their description as relatively suspicious, irritable and vengeful (e.g., McCraw and 
John, 1992; Costa and McCrae, 1992). Similarly, the finding that more conscientious 
people expressed greater anger towards defectors is not difficult to interpret. Goldberg 
(1993) describes them, among other things, as orderly, organized, systematic, punctual, 
economical and thrifty. Apart from the ethical dimension of the matter, defection by 
another group member would represent a considerable upset and disturbance to the 
conscientious person’s organization and planning. We also found a negative relationship 
between extraversion and desire to punish. Introverts have been conceptualized, among 
other things, as timid and unassertive (Goldberg, 1992), traits that are difficult to reconcile 
with the results of this study, but a possible explanation might be found in their lower 
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reliance on social interactions, and consequently increased tolerance of dissatisfaction or 
even hostility on the part of others. Introverts might therefore be more willing to assume 
the social costs of retaliation (Janssen and Bushman, 2008). This line of reasoning suggests 
that the costs of punishment are considerable, and can potentially disrupt extraverts’ fabric 
of social relations. 
It was perhaps surprising that individual variation in desire to punish, and anger at 
transgressors in the collaborative venture, were not predicted by participants’ scores on the 
Neuroticism dimension. Individuals who score highly on this dimension tend to experience 
emotions such as anger more readily, and anger has been implicated in the tendency to 
engage in costly punishment (Seip, van Dijk, and Rotteveel, 2009), as well as competitive 
attack responses in a wartime prisoner’s dilemma game (Kassinove, Roth, Owens, and 
Fuller, 2002). In one of Seip, van Dijk, and Rotteveel’s (2009) studies, more punishment 
was elicited in participants who had been primed with feelings of anger (by recalling and 
describing an autobiographical episode involving anger) compared to a control group. It 
thus appears likely that the emotion of anger is important in driving punishment behavior, 
and in our study, level of anger at the transgressor was highly correlated with desire to 
punish (r = .545, p < .001). However, while anger as an emotion is not restricted to 
individuals scoring highly on neuroticism, one would expect such people to display higher 
than average levels of anger. Thus, the lack of relationship between punishment and 
Neuroticism indicates that the links between personality traits and punishment behavior 
extend beyond proneness to anger. 
Before we leave this discussion, however, one should note that the tool we used to 
assess personality dimensions might in fact underestimate the effects under investigation. 
Due to time constraints on our participants (members of the public passing through a 
science museum), we employed a ten-item personality (TIPI) questionnaire, assessing 
individual scores on each of the five personality dimensions on the basis of responses to 
only two items. Although scores on the TIPI correlate well with scores generated by more 
detailed instruments (Gosling et al. 2003), its internal consistency is lower than typically 
found in such instruments (in both our sample and that originally reported by Gosling et 
al.). Thus, although the fact that we found significant relationships between personality and 
punishment variables when using this tool implies a robust effect, future studies should 
consider use of a more detailed personality questionnaire. 
A potential criticism of our study is that it relies on responses to hypothetical 
scenarios and involves no actual monetary (or other) cost to participants. In light of the 
findings we describe here, it would certainly be interesting to examine whether and how the 
links between personality and punishment hold in an experimental setting. However, as 
O’Gorman et al. (2005) discussed at some length, the scenarios presented in their study and 
also used here were designed to resemble real-world interactions, produced comparable 
results to experiments on altruistic punishment, and strongly engaged the participants. Like 
them, we found marked variation between participants in levels of anger, desire to punish 
and willingness to punish at their own expense. Even though they were fictional scenarios 
and did not involve actual cost to participants, a very high proportion (60%) indicated they 
would not pay anything to punish, indicating they were treating the scenario seriously and 
behaving as one would expect in the real world. Furthermore, the overall pattern of our 
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results map very closely onto O’Gorman et al.’s, indicating reliability of the scenarios, and 
both sets of results produce results that are directly predicted by evolutionary principles 
such as kin selection and game theory. For these reasons, we concur with O’Gorman et al. 
that the effects elicited by these scenarios are unlikely to be an artefact of the procedure; on 
the contrary, we believe it is more likely than not that they reflect how people will respond 
to actual social injustices encountered in the real world. 
Although here we have concentrated solely on psychological traits, studies have also 
begun to address the possible utility of biological markers in predicting punishing behavior. 
It has been found, for example, that men with higher levels of testosterone are more likely 
to punish selfish offers in the ultimatum game (Burnham, 2007). Along with such 
measures, our results suggest that personality may play a critical role in determining 
individual variation in willingness to engage in punishment. This provides at least a partial 
explanation for apparently irrational behavior in experimental games: because personality 
types are relatively stable, patterns of behavior associated with certain personality 
dimensions could render individuals susceptible to engaging in enigmatic costly 
punishment, even in one-shot interactions. 
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Appendix 
Scenarios presented to participants 
Two scenarios were presented to each participant in randomised order. Sections in italics 
and [square brackets] denote alternative parts of the scenario presented to different 
participants, altered to manipulate genetic relatedness and probability of future interaction. 
The titles to the two scenarios (helping scenario and punishment scenario), presented here 
for the reader’s benefit, were not included in the presented scenario. 
 
 
A. Helping scenario. 
Suppose that you and your nine cousins [nine strangers] in your town decide to pool your 
money to invest in the stock market. Pooling the money allows the group to qualify for 
lower transaction costs than if each person invests separately. Each person aggress to 
contribute £1000 to the pool and to equally share the profits or losses. The stocks only 
break even after only one year. One investing member had anticipated a profit to pay for 
emergency medical bills. 
 
All of you live in the same town and this person is likely to [This person is moving to 
another town and is unlikely to] associate with you and your cousins [or your friends] in the 
future. How much are you willing to contribute towards helping? 
1) How sorry would you feel towards this person? Please answer on a scale from 1 (not at 
all sorry) to 9 (extremely sorry). 
2) How much would you like to help this person? Please answer on a scale from 1 (no 
interest in helping) to 9 (extremely interested in helping). 
3) What is the most you would be willing to give to help this person? 
4) Some of the other group members want to help the person, but others seem unwilling to 
help if it costs them anything. How angry would you feel towards those who do not want to 
help? Please answer on a scale from 1 (not at all angry) to 9 (extremely angry). 
 
B. Punishment scenario. 
Suppose that you and your nine cousins [nine strangers] in your town decide to pool your 
money to invest in the stock market. Pooling the money allows the group to qualify for 
lower transaction costs than if each person invests separately. Each person agrees to 
contribute £1000 to the pool and to equally share the profits or losses. The stocks do very 
well and triple in value after only one year. Just before you meet to divide the profits, you 
discover that the person who volunteered to keep the books only invested £200, changing 
the records so that others would not notice. You do some calculations and determine the 
following facts: 
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1. The total amount invested was £9,200 which tripled in value to £27,600. 
2. This was divided equally among all 10 friends to yield £2,760 for each person. 
3. The person who contributed £200 should have received only £600 and therefore received 
£2160 more than deserved. 
4. Everyone else should have received £3000, or £240 more than they actually got. 
All of you live in the same town and this person is likely to [The person is moving to 
another town and is unlikely to] associate with you or the other members of the club [and 
your cousins] in the future. How are you going to act? 
1) How angry would you feel toward this person? Please answer on a scale from 1 (not at 
all angry) to 9 (extremely angry). 
2) How much would you like to punish this person? Please answer on a scale from 1 (no 
interest in punishing to 9 (extremely interested in punishing). 
3) Although punishment can take many forms, if you think of it as an amount in pounds, 
how much do you think this person should pay for what he did? 
4) Punishing this person can take many forms, but if you think of it as an amount in 
pounds, what is the most you would be willing to pay to punish this person? 
 
